The probability distribution P from which the history of our universe is sampled represents a theory of everything or TOE. We assume P is formally describable. Since most (uncountably many) distributions are not, this imposes a strong inductive bias. We show that P (x) is small for any universe x lacking a short description, and study the spectrum of TOEs spanned by two P s, one reflecting the most compact constructive descriptions, the other the fastest way of computing everything. The former derives from generalizations of traditional computability, Solomonoff's algorithmic probability, Kolmogorov complexity, and objects more random than Chaitin's Omega, the latter from Levin's universal search and a natural resource-oriented postulate: the cumulative prior probability of all x incomputable within time t by this optimal algorithm should be 1/t. Between both P s we find a universal cumulatively enumerable measure that dominates traditional enumerable measures; any such CEM must assign low probability to any universe lacking a short enumerating program. We derive P -specific consequences for evolving observers, inductive reasoning, quantum physics, philosophy, and the expected duration of our universe.
Introduction to Describable Universes
An object X is formally describable if a finite amount of information completely describes X and only X. More to the point, X should be representable by a possibly infinite bitstring x such that there is a finite, possibly never halting program p that computes x and nothing but x in a way that modifies each output bit at most finitely many times; that is, each finite beginning of x eventually converges and ceases to change. Definitions 2.1-2.5 will make this precise, and Sections 2-3 will clarify that this constructive notion of formal describability is less restrictive than the traditional notion of computability [92] , mainly because we do not insist on the existence of a halting program that computes an upper bound of the convergence time of p's n-th output bit. Formal describability thus pushes constructivism [17, 6] to the extreme, barely avoiding the nonconstructivism embodied by even less restrictive concepts of describability (compare computability in the limit [39, 65, 34] and ∆ 0 n -describability [67] [56, p. 46-47] ). The results in Sections 2-5 will exploit the additional degrees of freedom gained over traditional computability, while Section 6 will focus on another extreme, namely, the fastest way of computing all computable objects.
Among the formally describable things are the contents of all books ever written, all proofs of all theorems, the infinite decimal expansion of √ 17, and the enumerable "number of wisdom" Ω [28, 80, 21, 85] . Most real numbers, however, are not individually describable, because there are only countably many finite descriptions, yet uncountably many reals, as observed by Cantor in 1873 [23] . It is easy though to write a never halting program that computes all finite prefixes of all real numbers. In this sense certain sets seem describable while most of their elements are not.
What about our universe, or more precisely, its entire past and future history? Is it individually describable by a finite sequence of bits, just like a movie stored on a compact disc, or a never ending evolution of a virtual reality determined by a finite algorithm? If so, then it is very special in a certain sense, just like the comparatively few describable reals are special. Example 1.1 (Pseudorandom universe) Let x be an infinite sequence of finite bitstrings x 1 , x 2 , . . . representing the history of some discrete universe, where x k represents the state of the universe at discrete time step k, and x 1 the "Big Bang" (compare [72] ). Suppose there is a finite algorithm A that computes x k+1 (k ≥ 1) from x k and additional information noise k (this may require numerous computational steps of A, that is, "local" time of the universe may run comparatively slowly). Assume that noise k is not truly random but calculated by invoking a finite pseudorandom generator subroutine [3] . Then x is describable because it has a finite constructive description.
Contrary to a widely spread misunderstanding, quantum physics, quantum computation (e.g., [9, 31, 64] ) and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle do not rule out that our own universe's history is of the type exemplified above. It might be computable by a discrete process approximated by Schrödinger's continuous wave function, where noise k determines the "collapses" of the wave function. Since we prefer simple, formally describable explanations over complex, nondescribable ones, we assume the history of our universe has a finite description indeed.
This assumption has dramatic consequences. For instance, because we know that our future lies among the few (countably many) describable futures, we can ignore uncountably many nondescribable ones. Can we also make more specific predictions? Does it make sense to say some describable futures are necessarily more likely than others? To answer such questions we will examine possible probability distributions on possible futures, assuming that not only the histories themselves but also their probabilities are formally describable. Since most (uncountably many) real-valued probabilities are not, this assumption -against which there is no physical evidence -actually represents a major inductive bias, which turns out to be strong enough to explain certain hitherto unexplained aspects of our world. Example 1.2 (In which universe am I?) Let h(y) represent a property of any possibly infinite bitstring y, say, h(y) = 1 if y represents the history of a universe inhabited by a particular observer (say, yourself) and h(y) = 0 otherwise. According to the weak anthropic principle [24, 4] , the conditional probability of finding yourself in a universe compatible with your existence equals 1. But there may be many y's satisfying h(y) = 1. What is the probability that y = x, where x is a particular universe satisfying h(x) = 1? According to Bayes, P (x = y | h(y) = 1) = P (h(y) = 1 | x = y)P (x = y)
where P (A | B) denotes the probability of A, given knowledge of B, and the denominator is just a normalizing constant. So the probability of finding yourself in universe x is essentially determined by P (x), the prior probability of x.
Each prior P stands for a particular "theory of everything" or TOE. Once we know something about P we can start making informed predictions. Parts of this paper deal with the question: what are plausible properties of P ? One very plausible assumption is that P is approximable for all finite prefixesx of x in the following sense. There exists a possibly never halting computer which outputs a sequence of numbers T (t,x) at discrete times t = 1, 2, . . . in response to inputx such that for each real ǫ > 0 there exists a finite time t 0 such that for all t ≥ t 0 :
| P (x) − T (t,x) |< ǫ.
Approximability in this sense is essentially equivalent to formal describability (Lemma 2.1 will make this more precise). We will show (Section 5) that the mild assumption above adds enormous predictive power to the weak anthropic principle: it makes universes describable by short algorithms immensely more likely than others. Any particular universe evolution is highly unlikely if it is determined not only by simple physical laws but also by additional truly random or noisy events. To a certain extent, this will justify "Occam's razor" (e.g., [11] ) which expresses the ancient preference of simple solutions over complex ones, and which is widely accepted not only in physics and other inductive sciences, but even in the fine arts [74] . All of this will require an extension of earlier work on Solomonoff's algorithmic probability, universal priors, Kolmogorov complexity (or algorithmic information), and their refinements [50, 82, 26, 100, 52, 54, 35, 27, 36, 77, 83, 28, 5, 29, 93, 56] . We will prove several theorems concerning approximable and enumerable objects and probabilities (Sections 2-5; see outline below). These theorems shed light on the structure of all formally describable objects and extend traditional computability theory; hence they should also be of interest without motivation through describable universes.
The calculation of the subjects of these theorems, however, may occasionally require excessive time, itself often not even computable in the classic sense. This will eventually motivate a shift of focus on the temporal complexity of "computing everything" (Section 6). If you were to sit down and write a program that computes all possible universes, which would be the best way of doing so? Somewhat surprisingly, a modification of Levin Search [53] can simultaneously compute all computable universes in an interleaving fashion that outputs each individual universe as quickly as its fastest algorithm running just by itself, save for a constant factor independent of the universe's size. This suggests a more restricted TOE that singles out those infinite universes computable with countable time and space resources, and a natural resource-based prior measure S on them. Given this "speed prior" S, we will show that the most likely continuation of a given observed history is computable by a fast and short algorithm (Section 6.6).
The S-based TOE will provoke quite specific prophecies concerning our own universe (Section 7.5). For instance, the probability that it will last 2 n times longer than it has lasted so far is at most 2 −n . Furthermore, all apparently random events, such as beta decay or collapses of Schrödinger's wave function of the universe, actually must exhibit yet unknown, possibly nonlocal, regular patterns reflecting subroutines (e.g., pseudorandom generators) of our universe's algorithm that are not only short but also fast.
Outline of Main Results
Some of the novel results herein may be of interest to theoretical computer scientists and mathematicians (Sections 2-6), some to researchers in the fields of machine learning and inductive inference (the science of making predictions based on observations, e.g., 6-7), some to physicists (e.g., [6] [7] [8] , some to philosophers (e.g., [7] [8] . Sections 7-8 might help those usually uninterested in technical details to decide whether they would also like to delve into the more formal Sections 2-6. In what follows, we summarize the main contributions and provide pointers to the most important theorems.
Section 2 introduces universal Turing Machines (TMs) more general than those considered in previous related work: unlike traditional TMs, General TMs or GTMs may edit their previous outputs (compare inductive TMs [18] ), and Enumerable Output Machines (EOMs) may do this provided the output does not decrease lexicographically. We will define: a formally describable object x has a finite, never halting GTM program that computes x such that each output bit is revised at most finitely many times; that is, each finite prefix of x eventually stabilizes (Defs. 2.1-2.5); describable functions can be implemented by such programs (Def. 2.10); weakly decidable problems have solutions computable by never halting programs whose output is wrong for at most finitely many steps (Def. 2.11). Theorem 2.1 generalizes the halting problem by demonstrating that it is not weakly decidable whether a finite string is a description of a describable object (compare a related result for analytic TMs by Hotz, Vierke and Schieffer [45] ).
Section 3 generalizes the traditional concept of Kolmogorov complexity or algorithmic information [50, 82, 26] of finite x (the length of the shortest halting program computing x) to the case of objects describable by nonhalting programs on EOMs and GTMs (Defs. 3.2-3.4). It is shown that the generalization for EOMs is describable, but the one for GTMs is not (Theorem 3.1). Certain objects are much more compactly encodable on EOMs than on traditional monotone TMs, and Theorem 3.3 shows that there are also objects with short GTM descriptions yet incompressible on EOMs and therefore "more random" than Chaitin's Ω [28] , the halting probability of a TM with random input, which is incompressible only on monotone TMs. This yields a natural TM type-specific complexity hierarchy expressed by Inequality (14) . Section 4 discusses probability distributions on describable objects as well as the nondescribable convergence probability of a GTM (Def. 4.14). It also introduces describable (semi)measures as well as cumulatively enumerable measures (CEMs, Def. 4.5), where the cumulative probability of all strings lexicographically greater than a given string x is EOM-computable or enumerable. Theorem 4.1 shows that there is a universal CEM that dominates all other CEMs, in the sense that it assigns higher probability to any finite y, save for a constant factor independent of y. This probability is shown to be equivalent to the probability that an EOM whose input bits are chosen randomly produces an output starting with y (Corollary 4.3 and Lemma 4.2). The nonenumerable universal CEM also dominates enumerable priors studied in previous work by Solomonoff, Levin and others [82, 100, 54, 35, 27, 36, 77, 83, 28, 56] . Theorem 4.2 shows that there is no universal approximable measure (proof by M. Hutter).
Section 5 establishes relationships between generalized Kolmogorov complexity and gen-eralized algorithmic probability, extending previous work on enumerable semimeasures by Levin, Gács, and others [100, 54, 35, 27, 36, 56] . For instance, Theorem 5.3 shows that the universal CEM assigns a probability to each enumerable object proportional to 1 2 raised to the power of the length of its minimal EOM-based description, times a small corrective factor. Similarly, objects with approximable probabilities yet without very short descriptions on GTMs are necessarily very unlikely a priori (Theorems 5.4 and 5.5). Additional suspected links between generalized Kolmogorov complexity and probability are expressed in form of Conjectures 5.1-5.3.
Section 6 addresses issues of temporal complexity ignored in the previous sections on describable universe histories (whose computation may require excessive time without recursive bounds). In Subsection 6.2, Levin's universal search algorithm [53, 55] (which takes into account program runtime in an optimal fashion) is modified to obtain the fastest way of computing all "S-describable" universes computable within countable time (Def. 6.1, Section 6.3); uncountably many other universes are ignored because they do not even exist from a constructive point of view. Postulate 6.1 then introduces a natural resource-oriented bias reflecting constraints of whoever calculated our universe (possibly as a by-product of a search for something else): we assign to universes prior probabilities inversely proportional to the time and space resources consumed by the most efficient way of computing them. Given the resulting "speed prior S" (Def. 6.5) and past observations x, Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.1 demonstrate that the best way of predicting a future y is to minimize the Levin complexity of (x, y).
Section 7 puts into perspective the algorithmic priors (recursive and enumerable) introduced in previous work on inductive inference by Solomonoff and others [82, 83, 56, 47] , as well as the novel priors discussed in the present paper (cumulatively enumerable, approximable, resource-optimal). Collectively they yield an entire spectrum of algorithmic TOEs. We evaluate the plausibility of each prior being the one from which our own universe is sampled, discuss its connection to "Occam's razor" as well as certain physical and philosophical consequences, argue that the resource-optimal speed prior S may be the most plausible one (Section 7.4), analyze the inference problem from the point of view of an observer [13, 14, 91, 99, 87, 68] evolving in a universe sampled from S, make appropriate predictions for our own universe (Section 7.5), and discuss their falsifiability.
Preliminaries

Notation
Much but not all of the notation used here is similar or identical to the one used in the standard textbook on Kolmogorov complexity by Li and Vitányi [56] .
Since sentences over any finite alphabet are encodable as bitstrings, without loss of generality we focus on the binary alphabet B = {0, 1}. λ denotes the empty string, B * the set of finite sequences over B, B ∞ the set of infinite sequences over B,
stand for strings in B ♯ . If x ∈ B * then xy is the concatenation of x and y (e.g., if x = 10000 and y = 1111 then xy = 100001111). Let us order B ♯ lexicographically: if x precedes y alpha-betically (like in the example above) then we write x ≺ y or y ≻ x; if x may also equal y then we write x y or y x (e.g., λ ≺ 001 ≺ 010 ≺ 1 ≺ 1111...). The context will make clear where we also identify x ∈ B * with a unique nonnegative integer 1x (e.g., string 0100 is represented by integer 10100 in the dyadic system or 20 = 1 * 2 4 + 0 * 2 3 + 1 * 2 2 + 0 * 2 1 + 0 * 2 0 in the decimal system). Indices i, j, m, m 0 , m 1 , n, n 0 , t, t 0 range over the positive integers, constants c, c 0 , c 1 over the positive reals, f, g denote functions mapping integers to integers, log the logarithm with basis 2, lg(r) = max k {integer k : 2 k ≤ r} for real r > 0. For x ∈ B * \{λ}, 0.x stands for the real number with dyadic expansion x (note that 0.x0111.... = 0.x1 = 0.x10 = 0.x100... for x ∈ B * , although x0111.... = x1 = x10 = x100...). For x ∈ B * , l(x) denotes the number of bits in x, where l(x) = ∞ for x ∈ B ∞ ; l(λ) = 0. x n is the prefix of x consisting of the first n bits, if l(x) ≥ n, and x otherwise (x 0 := λ). For those x ∈ B * that contain at least one 0-bit, x ′ denotes the lexicographically smallest y ≻ x satisfying l(y) ≤ l(x) (x ′ is undefined for x of the form 111 . . . 1). We write f (n) = O(g(n)) if there exists c, n 0 such that f (n) ≤ cg(n) for all n > n 0 . [56, p. 276 ff]) with several tapes, each tape being a finite chain of adjacent squares with a scanning head initially pointing to the leftmost square. There is one output tape and at least two work tapes (sufficient to compute everything traditionally regarded as computable). The MTM has a finite number of internal states, one of them being the initial state. MTM behavior is specified by a lookup table mapping current state and contents of the squares above work tape scanning heads to a new state and an instruction to be executed next. There are instructions for shifting work tape scanning heads one square left or right (appending new squares when necessary), and for writing 0 or 1 on squares above work tape scanning heads. The only input-related instruction requests an input bit determined by an external process and copies it onto the square above the first work tape scanning head. There may or may not be a halt instruction to terminate a computation. Sequences of requested input bits are called self-delimiting programs because they convey all information about their own length, possibly causing the MTM to halt [54, 35, 27] , or at least to cease requesting new input bits (the typical case in this paper). MTMs are called monotone because they have a one-way write-only output tape -they cannot edit their previous output, because the only ouput instructions are: append a new square at the right end of the output tape and fill it with 0/1.
Turing Machines
General TMs (GTMs). GTMs are like MTMs but have additional output instructions to edit their previous output. Our motivation for introducing GTMs is that certain bitstrings are compactly describable on nonhalting GTMs but not on MTMs, as will be seen later. This has consequences for definitions of individual describability and probability distributions on describable things. The additional instructions are: (a) shift output scanning head right/left (but not out of bounds); (b) delete square at the right end of the output tape (if it is not the initial square or above the scanning head); (c) write 1 or 0 on square above output scanning head. Compare Burgin's inductive TMs and super-recursive algorithms [18, 19] .
Enumerable Output Machines (EOMs). Like GTMs, EOMs can edit their previous output, but not such that it decreases lexicographically. The expressive power of EOMs lies in between those of MTMs and GTMs, with interesting computability-related properties whose analogues do not hold for GTMs. EOMs are like MTMs, except that the only permitted output instruction sequences are: (a) shift output tape scanning head left/right unless this leads out of bounds; (b) replace bitstring starting above the output scanning head by the string to the right of the scanning head of the second work tape, readjusting output tape size accordingly, but only if this lexicographically increases the contents of the output tape. The necessary test can be hardwired into the finite TM transition table.
Infinite Computations, Convergence, Formal Describability
Most traditional computability theory focuses on properties of halting programs. Given an MTM or EOM or GTM T with halt instruction and p, x ∈ B * , we write
for "p computes x on T and halts". Much of this paper, however, deals with programs that never halt, and with TMs that do not need halt instructions. ♯ iff for each n satisfying 0 ≤ n ≤ l(x) there exists a postive integer t n such that for all t ≥ t n : T t (p) n = x n and l(T t (p)) ≤ l(x). Then we write
Although each beginning or prefix of x eventually becomes stable during the possibly infinite computation, there need not be a halting program that computes an upper bound of stabilization time, given any p and prefix size. Compare the concept of computability in the limit [39, 65, 34] and [41, 63] .
Objects with infinite shortest descriptions on T are not T -describable. Example 2.1 (Pseudorandom universe based on halting problem) Let x be a universe history in the style of Example 1.1. Suppose its pseudorandom generator's n-th output bit P RG(n) is 1 if the n-th program of an ordered list of all possible programs halts, and 0 otherwise. Since P RG(n) is describable, x is too. But there is no halting algorithm computing P RG(n) for all n, otherwise the halting problem would be solvable, which it is not [92] . Hence in general there is no computer that outputs x and only x without ever editing some previously computed history.
Definition 2.6 (Always converging TMs) TM T always converges if for all of its possible programs
For example, MTMs and EOMs converge always. GTMs do not. 
Formally Describable Functions
Much of the traditional theory of computable functions focuses on halting programs that map subsets of B * to subsets of B * . The output of a program that does not halt is usually regarded as undefined, which is occasionally expressed by notation such as T (p) = ∞. In this paper, however, we will not lump together all the possible outputs of nonhalting programs onto a single symbol "undefined." Instead we will consider mappings from subsets of B * to subsets of B ♯ , sometimes from B ♯ to B ♯ . 
Definition 2.8 (Encoding
Definition 2.10 (Describable Functions) Let T denote a TM using the encoding of Def. 
A function
h : D 1 ⊂ B * → D 2 ⊂ B ♯ is T -describable if for all x ∈ D 1 : T (p(x)) ; h(x). Let C denote
Weak Decidability and Convergence Problem
Traditionally, decidability of some problem class implies there is a halting algorithm that prints out the answer, given a problem from the class. We now relax the notion of decidability by allowing for infinite computations on EOMs or GTMs whose answers converge after finite yet possibly unpredictable time. Essentially, an answer needs to be correct for almost all the time, and may be incorrect for at most finitely many initial time steps (compare computability in the limit [41, 39, 65, 34] and super-recursive algorithms [18, 19] ). Example 2.2 Is a given string p ∈ B * a halting program for a given MTM? The problem is not decidable in the traditional sense (no halting algorithm solves the general halting problem [92] ), but weakly decidable and even E-decidable, by a trivial algorithm: print "0" on first output square; simulate the MTM on work tapes and apply it to p, once it halts after having read no more than l(p) bits print "1" on first output square. Example 2.3 It is weakly decidable whether a finite bitstring p is a program for a given TM. Algorithm: print "0"; feed p bitwise into the internally simulated TM whenever it requests a new input bit; once the TM has requested l(p) bits, print "1"; if it requests an additional bit, print "0". After finite time the output will stabilize forever. Proof. A proof conceptually quite similar to the one below was given by Hotz, Vierke and Schieffer [45] in the context of analytic TMs [25] derived from R-Machines [10] (the alphabet of analytic TMs is real-valued instead of binary). Version 1.0 of this paper [75] was written without awareness of this work. Nevertheless, the proof in Version 1.0 is repeated here because it does serve illustrative purposes.
In a straightforward manner we adapt Turing's proof of the undecidability of the MTM halting problem [92] , a reformulation of Gödel's celebrated result [38] , using the diagonalization trick whose roots date back to Cantor's proof that one cannot count the real numbers [23] . Let us write T (x) ↓ if there is a z ∈ B ♯ such that T (x) ; z. Let us write T (x) if T 's output fluctuates forever in response to x (e.g., by flipping from 1 to zero and back forever). Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . be an effective enumeration of all GTMs. Uniquely encode all pairs of finite strings (x, y) in B * × B * as finite strings code(x, y) ∈ B * . Suppose there were a GTM U such that (*): for all x, y ∈ B * : U(code(x, y)) ; 1 if A x (y) ↓, and U(code(x, y)) ; 0 otherwise. Then one could construct a GTM T with T (x) ; 1 if U(code(x, x)) ; 0, and T (x) otherwise. Let y be the index of T = A y , then A y (y) ↓ if U(code(y, y)) ; 0, otherwise A y (y) . By (*), however, U(code(y, y)) ; 1 if A y (y) ↓, and U(code(y, y)) ; 0 if A y (y) . Contradiction. 2 
Complexity of Constructive Descriptions
Throughout this paper we focus on TMs with self-delimiting programs [52, 54, 35, 27] . Traditionally, the Kolmogorov complexity [50, 82, 26] or algorithmic complexity or algorithmic information of x ∈ B * is the length of the shortest halting program computing x:
universal MTM or EOM or GTM U with halt instruction, and define
Let us now extend this to nonhalting GTMs.
Generalized Kolmogorov Complexity for EOMs and GTMs Definition 3.2 (Generalized K T ) Given any TM T, define
Compare Schnorr's "process complexity" for MTMs [77, 94] .
. We drop the index T , writing
This is justified by an appropriate Invariance Theorem [50, 82, 26] : there is a positive constant c such that
for all x, since the size of the compiler that translates arbitrary programs for T into equivalent programs for U C does not depend on x.
Consider Def.
If C denotes a set of TMs with universal TM
U C , then define Km C (x) = Km U C (x).
Km
C is a generalization of Schnorr's [77] and Levin's [52] complexity measure Km M for MTMs.
Describability issues. K(x)
is not computable by a halting program [50, 82, 26] , but obviously G-computable or describable; the z with 0.z =
is even enumerable. Even K E (x) is describable, using the following algorithm:
Run all EOM programs in "dovetail style" such that the n-th step of the i-th program is executed in the n + i-th phase (i = 1, 2, . . .); whenever a program outputs x, place it (or its prefix read so far) in a tentative list L of x-computing programs or program prefixes; whenever an element of L produces output ≻ x, delete it from L; whenever an element of L requests an additional input bit, update L accordingly. After every change of L replace the current estimate of K E (x) by the length of the shortest element of L. This estimate will eventually stabilize forever.
Proof. Identify finite bitstrings with the integers they represent. If
where g is any fixed recursive function, and also
Since the number of descriptions p with l(p) < n − O(1) cannot exceed 2 n−O (1) , but the number of strings x with l(x) = n equals 2 n , most x cannot be compressed by more than O(1) bits; that is, K G (x) ≥ log x−O(1) for most x. From (9) we therefore obtain K G (f (x)) > log g(x)−O(1) for large enough x, because f (x) picks out one of the incompressible y ≤ g(x). However, obviously we also would have (1), using the encoding of Def. 2.8. Contradiction for quickly growing g with low complexity, such as g(x) = 2 2 x . 2
Expressiveness of EOMs and GTMs
On their internal work tapes MTMs can compute whatever GTMs can compute. But they commit themselves forever once they print out some bit. They are ill-suited to the case where the output may require subsequent revision after time intervals unpredictable in advance -compare Example 2.1. Alternative MTMs that print out sequences of result updates (separated by, say, commas) would compute other things besides the result, and hence not satisfy the "don't compute anything else" aspect of individual describability. Recall from the introduction that in a certain sense there are uncountably many collectively describable strings, but only countably many individually describable ones. Since GTMs may occasionally rewrite parts of their output, they are computationally more expressive than MTMs in the sense that they permit much more compact descriptions of certain objects. For instance, K(x) − K G (x) is unbounded, as will be seen next. This will later have consequences for predictions, given certain observations.
Proof. Define
where g is recursive. Then
) for infinitely many x and quickly growing g with low complexity. 2
EOMs More Expressive Than MTMs
Similarly, some x are compactly describable on EOMs but not on MTMs. To see this, consider Chaitin's Ω, the halting probability of an MTM whose input bits are obtained by tossing an unbiased coin whenever it requests a new bit [28] . Ω is enumerable (dovetail over all programs p and sum up the contributions 2 −l(p) of the halting p), but there is no recursive upper bound on the number of instructions required to compute Ω n , given n. This implies
It is easy to see, however, that on nonhalting EOMs there are much more compact descriptions:
that is, there is no upper bound of
GTMs More Expressive Than EOMs -Objects Less Regular Than Ω
We will now show that there are describable strings that have a short GTM description yet are "even more random" than Chaitin's Omegas, in the sense that even on EOMs they do not have any compact descriptions. 
Proof. For x ∈ B * \{λ} and universal EOM T define
First note that the dyadic expansion of Ξ(x) is EOM-computable or enumerable. The algorithm works as follows:
Algorithm A: Initialize the real-valued variable V by 0, run all possible programs of EOM T dovetail style such that the n-th step of the i-th program is executed in the n + i-th phase; whenever the output of a program prefix q starts with some y satisfying 0.y > 0.x for the first time, set V := V + 2 −l(q) ; henceforth ignore continuations of q.
V approximates Ξ(x) from below in enumerable fashion -infinite p are not worrisome as T must only read a finite prefix of p to observe 0.y > 0.x if the latter holds indeed. We will now show that knowledge of Ξ(x) n , the first n bits of Ξ(x), allows for constructing a bitstring z with K E (z) ≥ n − O(1) when x has low complexity.
Suppose we know Ξ(x) n . Once algorithm A above yields V > Ξ(x) n we know that no programs p with l(p) < n will contribute any more to V. Choose the shortest z satisfying 0.z = (0.y min − 0.x)/2, where y min is the lexicographically smallest y previously computed by algorithm A such that 0.y > 0.x. Then z cannot be among the strings T-describable with fewer than n bits. Using the Invariance Theorem (compare Def. 3.3) we obtain
While prefixes of Ω are greatly compressible on EOMs, z is not. On the other hand, z is compactly G-describable:
The discussion above reveils a natural complexity hierarchy. Ignoring additive constants, we have
where for each "≤" relation above there are x which allow for replacing "≤" by "<."
Measures and Probability Distributions
Suppose x represents the history of our universe up until now. What is its most likely continuation y ∈ B ♯ ? Bayes' theorem yields
where
is the probability of z 2 , given knowledge of z 1 , and
is a normalizing factor. The most likely continuation y is determined by P (xy), the prior probability of xy -compare the similar Equation (1) . Now what are the formally describable ways of assigning prior probabilities to universes? In what follows we will first consider describable semimeasures on B * , then probability distributions on B ♯ .
Dominant and Universal (Semi)Measures
The next three definitions concerning semimeasures on B * are almost but not quite identical to those of discrete semimeasures [56, p. 245 ff] and continuous semimeasures [56, p. 272 ff] based on the work of Levin and Zvonkin [100] .
whereμ is a function
A notational difference to the approach of Levin [100] (who writes µ(x) ≤ µ(x0) + µ(x1)) is the explicit introduction ofμ. Compare the introduction of an undefined element u by Li and Vitanyi [56, p. 281] . Note that x∈B * μ(x) ≤ 1. Later we will discuss the interesting caseμ(x) = P (x), the a priori probability of x. In what follows, we will introduce describable semimeasures dominating those considered in previous work ( [100] , [56, 
Note that we could replace "l(x)" by "l(x)+c" in the definition above. Recall that x ′ denotes the smallest y ≻ x with l(y) ≤ l(x) (x ′ may be undefined). We have
Then µ(x) is the difference of two finite enumerable values, according to (20) .
Theorem 4.1 There is a universal CEM.
Proof. We first show that one can enumerate the CEMs, then construct a universal CEM from the enumeration. Check out differences to Levin's related proofs that there is a universal discrete semimeasure and a universal enumerable semimeasure [100, 52] * to B ♯ . Let EOM i denote the i-th EOM in the list, and let EOM i (x, n) denote its output after n instructions when applied to x ∈ B * . The following procedure filters out those EOM i that already represent CEMs, and transforms the others into representations of CEMs, such that we obtain a way of generating all and only CEMs. FOR n = 1, 2, . . . DO:
(1) Lexicographically order and rename all x with l(x) ≤ n:
(2) FOR k = 2 n+1 − 1 down to 1 DO:
If EOM i indeed represents a CEM µ i then each search process in (2.1) will terminate, and the V Cµ i (x) will enumerate the Cµ i (x) from below, and the V µ i (x) and Vμ i (x) will approximate the true µ i (x) andμ i (x), respectively, not necessarily from below though. Otherwise there will be a nonterminating search at some point, leaving V µ i from the previous loop as a trivial CEM. Hence we can enumerate all CEMs, and only those. Now define (compare [52] ):
and α n is an enumerable constant, e.g., α n = 6 πn 2 or α n = 1 n(n+1) (note a slight difference to Levin's classic approach which just requests n α n ≤ 1). Then µ 0 dominates every µ n by Def. 18, and is a semimeasure according to Def. 4.1:
(21) µ 0 also is a CEM by Def. 4.5, because
is enumerable, since α n and Cµ n (x) are (dovetail over all n). That is, µ 0 (x) is approximable as the difference of two enumerable finite values, according to Equation (20) . 2
Approximable and Cumulatively Enumerable Distributions
To deal with infinite x, we will now extend the treatment of semimeasures on B * in the previous subsection by discussing probability distributions on B ♯ .
Definition 4.6 (Probabilities) A probability distribution P on x ∈ B ♯ satisfies
Definition 4.9 (Universal Distributions) Let P be a set of probability distributions on x ∈ B ♯ . A distribution P 0 ∈ P is universal if for all P ∈ P: P 0 dominates P . It suffices to focus on x ∈ B * . Identify strings with integers, and assume P (x) is a universal approximable semidistribution. We construct an approximable semidistribution Q(x) that is not dominated by P (x), thus contradicting the assumption. Let P 0 (x), P 1 (x), . . . be a sequence of recursive functions converging to P (x). We recursively define a sequence Q 0 (x), Q 1 (x), . . . converging to Q(x). The basic idea is: each contribution to Q is the sum of n consecutive P probabilities (n increasing). Define Q 0 (x) := 0; I n := {y : n 2 ≤ y < (n+1) 2 }. Let n be such that x ∈ I n . Define j n t (k n t ) as the element with smallest P t (largest Q t−1 ) probability in this interval, i.e., j n t := minarg x∈In P t (x) (k n t := maxarg x∈In Q t−1 (x)). If n·P t (k n t ) is less than twice and n·P t (j n t ) is more than half of Q t−1 (k n t ), set Q t (x) = Q t−1 (x). [56] should be slightly modified. For instance, the sum could be taken over x i−1 < x ≤ x i . The sequence of inequalities xi−1<x≤xi P (x) > x i P (x i ) is then satisfiable by a suitable x i sequence, since lim inf x→∞ {xP (x)} = 0. The basic idea of the proof is correct, of course, and very useful.
Otherwise set Q t (x) = n·P t (j n t ) for x = j n t and Q t (x) = 0 for x = j n t . Q t (x) is obviously total recursive and non-negative. Since 2n ≤ |I n |, we have
Summing over n we observe that if P t is a semidistribution, so is Q t . From some t 0 on, P t (x) changes by less than a factor of 2 since P t (x) converges to P (x) > 0. Hence Q t (x) remains unchanged for t ≥ t 0 and converges to Q(x) := Q ∞ (x) = Q t 0 (x). But Q(j
is enumerable for all x ∈ B * , where
TM-Induced Distributions and Convergence Probability
Suppose TM T 's input bits are obtained by tossing an unbiased coin whenever a new one is requested. Levin's universal discrete enumerable semimeasure [52, 27, 35] or semidistribution m is limited to B * and halting programs:
Note that x m(x) < 1 if T universal. Let us now generalize this to B ♯ and nonhalting programs: Definition 4.12 (P T , KP T ) Suppose T 's input bits are obtained by tossing an unbiased coin whenever a new one is requested.
Program Continua. According to Def. 4.12, most infinite x have zero probability, but not those with finite programs, such as the dyadic expansion of 0.5 √ 2. However, a nonvanishing part of the entire unit of probability mass is contributed by continua of mostly incompressible strings, such as those with cumulative probability 2 −l(q) computed by the following class of uncountably many infinite programs with a common finite prefix q: "repeat forever: read and print next input bit." The corresponding traditional measure-oriented notation for
For notational simplicity, however, we will continue using the sign to indicate summation over uncountable objects, rather than using a measure-oriented notation for probability densities. The reader should not feel uncomfortable with this -the theorems in the remainder of the paper will focus on those x ∈ B ♯ with P (x) > 0; density-like nonzero sums over uncountably many bitsrings, each with individual measure zero, will not play any critical role in the proofs. Definition 4.13 (Universal TM-Induced Distributions P C ; KP C ) If C denotes a set of TMs with universal element U C , then we write
We have
The attribute universal is justified, because of the dominance P T (x) = O(P C (x)), due to the Invariance Theorem (compare Def. 3.3).
Since all programs of EOMs and MTMs converge, P E and P M are proper probability distributions on B ♯ . For instance, x P E (x) = 1. P G , however, is just a semidistribution. To obtain a proper probability distribution P N T , one might think of normalizing by the convergence probability Υ: Definition 4.14 (Convergence Probability) Given GTM T, define
Describability issues. Uniquely encode each TM T as a finite bitstring, and identify M, E, G with the corresponding sets of bitstrings. While the function
T is not, essentially due to Theorem 2.1.
Even P E (x) and P M (x) are generally not describable for x ∈ B ♯ , in the sense that there is no GTM T that takes as an input a finite description (or program) of any M-describable or E-describable x ∈ B ♯ and converges towards P M (x) or P E (x). This is because in general it is not even weakly decidable (Def. 2.11) whether two programs compute the same output. If we know that one of the program outputs is finite, however, then the conditions of weak decidability are fulfilled. Hence certain TM-induced distributions on B * are describable, as will be seen next. Initialize the real-valued variable V by 0, run all possible programs of EOM T dovetail style; whenever the output of a program prefix q starts with some y x for the first time, set V := V + 2 −l(q) ; henceforth ignore continuations of q.
In this way V enumerates CP E (x). Infinite p are not problematic as only a finite prefix of p must be read to establish y x if the latter indeed holds. 2
Similarly, facts of the form y ≻ x ∈ B * can be discovered after finite time. 
Now we will make the connection to the previous subsection on semimeasures on B * .
Universal TM-Induced Measures
Definition 4.16 (P-Induced Measure µP ) Given a distribution P on B ♯ , define a measure µP on B * as follows:
Note that µP (x) = P (x) (compare Def. 4.1):
For those x ∈ B * without 0-bit we have µP (x) = CP (x), for the others 
. If C denotes a set of TMs with universal element U C , then we write
We observe that µ C is universal among all T-induced semimeasures, T ∈ C. Note that
It will be obvious from the context when we deal with the restriction of µ C to B * .
is a CEM and approximable as the difference of two enumerable values: µ E (x) = CP E (x) for x without any 0-bit, otherwise 
Proof. In the enumeration of EOMs in the proof of Theorem 4.1, let EOM 0 be an EOM representing µ 0 . We build an EOM T such that µ T (x) = µ 0 (x). The rest follows from the Invariance Theorem (compare Def. 3.3).
T applies EOM 0 to all x ∈ B * in dovetail fashion, and simultaneously simply reads randomly selected input bits forever. At a given time, let string variable z denote T 's input string read so far. Starting at the right end of the unit interval [0, 1), as the Vμ 0 (x) are being updated by the algorithm of Theorem 4.1, T keeps updating a chain of finitely many, variable, disjoint, consecutive, adjacent, half-open intervals V I(x) of size Vμ 0 (x) in alphabetic order on x, such that V I(y) is to the right of V I(x) if y ≻ x. After every variable update and each increase of z, T replaces its output by the x of the V I(x) with 0.z ∈ V I(x). Since neither z nor the V Cµ 0 (x) in the algorithm of Theorem 4.1 can decrease (that is, all interval boundaries can only shift left), T 's output cannot either, and therefore is indeed EOM-computable. Obviously the following holds:
Probability vs Descriptive Complexity
The size of some computable object's minimal description is closely related to the object's probability. For instance, Levin [54] proved the remarkable Coding Theorem for his universal discrete enumerable semimeasure m based on halting programs (see Def. 4.11); compare independent work by Chaitin [27] who also gives credit to N. Pippenger:
In this special case, the contributions of the shortest programs dominate the probabilities of objects computable in the traditional sense. As shown by Gács [36] for the case of MTMs, however, contrary to Levin's [52] conjecture, µ M (x) = O(2 −Km M (x) ); but a slightly worse bound does hold:
The term −1 on the left-hand side stems from the definition of lg(x) ≤ log(x). We will now consider the case of probability distributions that dominate m, and semimeasures that dominate µ M , starting with the case of enumerable objects.
Theorems for EOMs and GTMs
Using K E (y) ≤ log y + 2log log y + O(1) for y interpreted as an integer -compare Def. 2.8 -this yields 2
That is, objects that are hard to describe (in the sense that they have only long enumerating descriptions) have low probability.
Proof. The left-hand inequality follows by definition. To show the right-hand side, one can build an EOM T that computes x ∈ B ♯ using not more than KP E (x) + K T (KP E (x)) + O(1) input bits in a way inspired by Huffman-Coding [46] . The claim then follows from the Invariance Theorem. The trick is to arrange T 's computation such that T 's output converges yet never needs to decrease lexicographically. T works as follows:
(A) Emulate U E to construct a real enumerable number 0.s encoded as a selfdelimiting input program r, simultaneously run all (possibly forever running) programs on U E dovetail style; whenever the output of a prefix q of any running program starts with some x ∈ B * for the first time, set variable V (x) := V (x) + 2 −l(q) (if no program has ever created output starting with x then first create V (x) initialized by 0); whenever the output of some extension q ′ of q (obtained by possibly reading additional input bits: q ′ = q if none are read) lexicographically increases such that it does not equal x any more, set V (x) := V (x) − 2 −l(q ′ ) . This will never violate the EOM constraints: the enumerable s cannot shrink, and since EOM outputs cannot decrease lexicographically, the interval boundaries RV (x) and LV (x) cannot grow (their negations are enumerable, compare Lemma 4.1), hence T 's output cannot decrease. For x ∈ B * the IV (x) converge towards an interval I(x) of size P E (x). For x ∈ B ∞ with P E (x) > 0, we have: for any ǫ > 0 there is a time t 0 such that for all time steps t > t 0 in T 's computation, an interval I ǫ (x) of size P E (x) − ǫ will be completely covered by certain IV (y) satisfying x ≻ y and 0.x − 0.y < ǫ. So for ǫ → 0 the I ǫ (x) also converge towards an interval I(x) of size P E (x). Hence T will output larger and larger y approximating x from below, provided 0.s ∈ I(x).
Since any interval of size c within [0, 1) contains a number 0.z with l(z) = −lg c, in both cases there is a number 0.s (encodable by some r satisfying r ≤ l(s)
, such that T (r) ; x, and therefore
Less symmetric statements can also be derived in very similar fashion:
compare Defs. 4.10 and 4.12; an EOM would be a special case). Then for x ∈ B
♯ , P T (x) > 0:
Proof. Modify the proof of Theorem 5.3 for approximable as opposed to enumerable interval boundaries and approximable 0.s. 2
A similar proof, but without the complication for the case x ∈ B ∞ , yields:
Theorem 5.5 Let µ denote an approximable semimeasure on x ∈ B * ; that is, µ(x) is describable. Then for µ(x) > 0:
As a consequence,
Proof. Initialize variables V λ := 1 and IV λ := [0, 1). Dovetailing over all x ≻ λ, approximate the GTM-computableμ(x) = µ(x) − µ(x0) − µ(x1) in variables V x initialized by zero, and create a chain of adjacent intervals IV x analogously to the proof of Theorem 5.3.
The IV x converge against intervals I x of sizeμ(x). Hence x is GTM-encodable by any program r producing an output s with 0.s ∈ I x : after every update, replace the GTM's output by the x of the IV x with 0.s ∈ IV x . Similarly, if 0.s is in the union of adjacent intervals I y of strings y starting with x, then the GTM's output will converge towards some string starting with x. The rest follows in a way similar to the one described in the final paragraph of the proof of Theorem 5.3. 
While P E dominates P M and P G dominates P E , the reverse statements are not true. In fact, given the results from Sections 3.2 and 5, one can now make claims such as the following ones:
The following functions are unbounded:
.
Proof. For the cases µ E and P E , apply Theorems 5.2, 5.6 and the unboundedness of (12). For the case P G , apply Theorems 3.3 and 5.3.
Tighter Bounds?
Is it possible to get rid of the small correction terms such as K E (KP E (x)) ≤ O(log(−logP E (x)) in Theorem 5.3? Note that the construction in the proof shows that K E (x) is actually bounded by K E (s), the complexity of the enumerable number 0.s ∈ I(x) with minimal K T (s). The facts x P M (x) = 1, x P E (x) = 1, x P G (x) < 1, as well as intuition and wishful thinking inspired by Shannon-Fano Theorem [78] and Coding Theorem 5.1 suggest there might indeed be tighter bounds:
The work of Gács has already shown, however, that analogue conjectures for semimeasures such as µ M (as opposed to distributions) are false [36] .
Between EOMs and GTMs?
The dominance of P G over P E comes at the expense of occasionally "unreasonable," nonconverging outputs. Are there classes of always converging TMs more expressive than EOMs? Consider a TM called a PEOM whose inputs are pairs of finite bitstrings x, y ∈ B * (code them using 2log l(x) + 2log l(y) + l(xy) + O(1) bits). The PEOM uses dovetailing to run all self-delimiting programs on the y-th EOM of an enumeration of all EOMs, to approximate the probability P EOM(y, x) (again encoded as a string) that the EOM's output starts with x. P EOM(y, x) is approximable (we may apply Theorem 5.5) but not necessarily enumerable. On the other hand, it is easy to see that PEOMs can compute all enumerable strings describable on EOMs. In this sense PEOMs are more expressive than EOMs, yet never diverge like GTMs. EOMs can encode some enumerable strings slightly more compactly, however, due to the PEOM's possibly unnecessarily bit-consuming input encoding. An interesting topic of future research may be to establish a partially ordered expressiveness hierarchy among classes of always converging TMs, and to characterize its top, if there is one, which we doubt. Candidates to consider may include TMs that approximate certain recursive or enumerable functions of enumerable strings.
Temporal Complexity
So far we have completely ignored the time necessary to compute objects from programs. In fact, the objects that are highly probable according to P G and P E and µ E introduced in the previous sections yet quite improbable according to less dominant priors studied earlier (such as µ M and recursive priors [100, 54, 83, 36, 56] ) are precisely those whose computation requires immense time. For instance, the time needed to compute the describable, even enumerable Ω n grows faster than any recursive function of n, as shown by Chaitin [28] . Analogue statements hold for the z of Theorem 3.2. Similarly, many of the semimeasures discussed above are approximable, but the approximation process is excessively time-consuming. Now we will study the opposite extreme, namely, priors with a bias towards the fastest way of producing certain outputs. Without loss of generality, we will focus on computations on a universal MTM. For simplicity let us extend the binary alphabet such that it contains an additional output symbol "blank."
Fast Computation of Finite and Infinite Strings
There are many ways of systematically enumerating all computable objects or bitstrings. All take infinite time. Some, however, compute individual strings much faster than others. To see this, first consider the trivial algorithm "ALPHABET," which simply lists all bitstrings ordered by size and separated by blanks (compare Marchal's thesis [60] and Moravec's library of all possible books [62] ). ALPHABET will eventually create all initial finite segments of all strings. For example, the nth bit of the string "11111111..." will appear as part of ALPHABET's 2 n -th output string. Note, however, that countably many steps are not sufficient to print any infinite string of countable size! There are much faster ways though. For instance, the algorithm used in the previous paper on the computable universes [72] sequentially computes all computable bitstrings by a particular form of dovetailing. Let p i denote the i-th possible program. Program p 1 is run for one instruction every second step (to simplify things, if the TM has a halt instruction and p 1 has halted we assume nothing is done during this step -the resulting loss of efficiency is not significant for what follows). Similarly, p 2 is run for one instruction every second of the remaining steps, and so on.
Following Li and Vitányi [56, p. 503 ff], let us call this popular dovetailer "SIMPLE." It turns out that SIMPLE actually is the fastest in a certain sense. For instance, the nth bit of string "11111111..." now will appear after at most O(n) steps (as opposed to at least O(n2 n ) steps for ALPHABET). Why? Let p k be the fastest algorithm that outputs "11111111...". Obviously p k computes the n-th bit within O(n) instructions. Now SIMPLE will execute one instruction of p k every 2 −k steps. But 2 −k is a positive constant that does not depend on n.
Generally speaking, suppose p k is among the fastest finite algorithms for string x and computes x n within at most O(f (n)) instructions, for all n. Then x's first n symbols will appear after at most O(f (n)) steps of SIMPLE. In this sense SIMPLE essentially computes each string as quickly as its fastest algorithm, although it is in fact computing all computable strings simultaneously. This may seem counterintuitive.
FAST: The Most Efficient Way of Computing Everything
Subsection 6.1 focused on SIMPLE "steps" allocated for instructions of single string-generating algorithms. Note that each such step may require numerous "micro-steps" for the computational overhead introduced by the need for organizing internal storage. For example, quickly growing space requirements for storing all strings may force a dovetailing TM to frequently shift its writing and scanning heads across large sections of its internal tapes. This may consume more time than necessary.
To overcome potential slow-downs of this kind, and to optimize the TM-specific "constant factor," we will slightly modify an optimal search algorithm called "Levin search" [53, 55, 1, 56] (see [73, 97, 76] for the first practical applications we are aware of). Essentially, we will strip Levin search of its search aspects and apply it to possibly infinite objects. This leads to the most efficient (up to a constant factor depending on the TM) algorithm for computing all computable bitstrings.
FAST Algorithm : For i = 1, 2, . . . perform PHASE i:
instructions of all program prefixes p satisfying l(p) ≤ i, and sequentially write the outputs on adjacent sections of the output tape, separated by blanks.
Following Levin [53] , within 2 k+1 TM steps, each of order O(1) "micro-steps" (no excessive computational overhead due to storage allocation etc.), FAST will generate all prefixes x n satisfying Kt(x n ) ≤ k, where x n 's Levin complexity Kt(x n ) is defined as Kt(x n ) = min q {l(q) + log t(q, x n )}, where program prefix q computes x n in t(q, x n ) time steps. The computational complexity of the algorithm is not essentially affected by the fact that PHASE i = 2, 3, . . ., repeats the computation of PHASE i − 1 which for large i is approximately half as short (ignoring nonessential speed-ups due to halting programs if there are any).
One difference between SIMPLE and FAST is that SIMPLE may allocate steps to algorithms with a short description less frequently than FAST. Suppose no finite algorithm computes x faster than p k which needs at most f (n) instructions for x n , for all n. While SIMPLE needs 2 k+1 f (n) steps to compute x n , following Levin [53] it can be shown that FAST requires at most 2
That is, SIMPLE and FAST share the same order of time complexity (ignoring SIMPLE's "micro-steps" for storage organization), but FAST's constant factor tends to be better.
Note that an observer A evolving in one of the universes computed by FAST might decide to build a machine that simulates all possible computable universes using FAST, and so on, recursively. Interestingly, this will not necessarily cause a dramatic exponential slowdown: if the n-th discrete time step of A's universe (compare Example 1.1) is computable within O(n) time then A's simulations can be as fast as the "original" simulation, save for a constant factor. In this sense a "Great Programmer" [72] who writes a program that runs all possible universes would not be superior to certain nested Great Programmers inhabiting his universes.
To summarize: the effort required for computing all computable objects simultaneously does not prevent FAST from computing each object essentially as quickly as its fastest algorithm. No other dovetailer can have a better order of computational complexity. This suggests a notion of describability that is much more restricted yet perhaps much more natural than the one used in the earlier sections on description size-based complexity.
Speed-Based Characterization of the Describable
The introduction mentioned that some sets seem describable in a certain sense while most of their elements are not. Although the dyadic expansions of most real numbers are not individually describable, the short algorithm ALPHABET from Section 6.1 will compute all their finite prefixes. However, ALPHABET is unable to print any infinite string using only countable time and storage. Rejection of the notion of uncountable storage and time steps leads to a speed-based definition of describability. Definition 6.1 ("S-describable" Objects) Some x ∈ B ♯ is S-describable ("S" for "Speed") if it has a finite algorithm that outputs x using countable time and space.
Lemma 6.1 With countable time and space requirements, FAST computes all S-describable strings.
To see this, recall that FAST will output any S-describable string as fast as its fastest algorithm, save for a constant factor. Those x with polynomial time bounds on the computation of x n (e.g., O(n 37 )) are S-describable, but most x ∈ B ♯ are not, as obvious from Cantor's insight [23] .
The prefixes x n of all x ∈ B ♯ , even of those that are not S-describable, are computed within at most O(n2 n ) steps, at least as quickly as by ALPHABET. The latter, however, never is faster than that, while FAST often is. Now consider infinite strings x whose fastest individual finite program needs even more than O(n2 n ) time steps to output x n and nothing but x n , such as Chaitin's Ω (or the even worse z from Theorem 3.3) -recall that the time for computing Ω n grows faster than any recursive function of n [28] . We observe that this result is irrelevant for FAST which will output Ω n within O(n2 n ) steps, but only because it also outputs many other strings besides Ω n -there is still no fast way of identifying Ω n among all the outputs. Ω is not S-describable because it is not generated any more quickly than uncountably many other infinite and incompressible strings, which are not S-describable either.
Enumerable Priors vs FAST
The FAST algorithm gives rise to a natural prior measure on the computable objects which is much less dominant than µ M , µ E and µ G . This prior will be introduced in Section 6.5 below. Here we first motivate it by evaluating drawbacks of the traditional, well-studied, enumerable prior µ M [82, 54, 83, 36, 56] in the context of FAST. 
but there is no recursive function i(x) such that
otherwise µ M (x) would be recursive. Therefore we might argue that the use of prior µ M is essentially equivalent to using a probabilistic version of FAST which randomly selects a phase according to a distribution assigning zero probability to any phase with recursively computable number. Since the time and space consumed by PHASE i is at least O(2 i ), we are approaching uncountable resources as i goes to infinity. From any reasonable computational perspective, however, the probability of a phase consuming more than countable resources clearly should be zero. This motivates the next subsection.
Speed Prior S and Algorithm GUESS
A resource-oriented point of view suggests the following postulate.
Postulate 6.1
The cumulative prior probability measure of all x incomputable within time t by the most efficient way of computing everything should be inversely proportional to t.
Since the most efficient way of computing all x is embodied by FAST, and since each phase of FAST consumes roughly twice the time and space resources of the previous phase, the cumulative prior probability of each finite phase should be roughly half the one of the previous phase; zero probability should be assigned to infinitely resource-consuming phases. Postulate 6.1 therefore suggests the following definition. 
We observe that S(x) is indeed a semimeasure (compare Def. 4.1):
Since x ∈ B * is first computed in PHASE Kt(x) within 2 Kt(x)+1 steps, we may rewrite:
S can be implemented by the following probabilistic algorithm for a universal MTM.
Algorithm GUESS:
1. Toss an unbiased coin until heads is up; let i denote the number of required trials; set t := 2 i .
2.
If the number of steps executed so far exceeds t then exit. Execute one step; if it is a request for an input bit, toss the coin to determine the bit, and set t := t/2. 3. Go to 2.
In the spirit of FAST, algorithm GUESS makes twice the computation time half as likely, and splits remaining time in half whenever a new bit is requested, to assign equal runtime to the two resulting sets of possible program continuations. Note that the expected runtime of GUESS is unbounded since i 2 −i 2 i does not converge. Expected runtime is countable, however, and expected space is of the order of expected time, due to numerous short algorithms producing a constant number of output bits per constant time interval.
Assuming our universe is sampled according to GUESS implemented on some machine, note that the true distribution is not essentially different from the estimated one based on our own, possibly different machine.
Speed Prior-Based Inductive Inference
Given S, as we observe an initial segment x ∈ B * of some string, which is the most likely continuation? Consider x's finite continuations xy, y ∈ B * . According to Bayes (compare Equation (15)),
where S(z 2 | z 1 ) is the measure of z 2 , given z 1 . Having observed x we will predict those y that maximize S(xy | x). Which are those? In what follows, we will confirm the intuition that for n → ∞ the only probable continuations of x n are those with fast programs. The sheer number of "slowly" computable strings cannot balance the speed advantage of "more quickly" computable strings with equal beginnings. 
∞ is S-describable, and p x ∈ B * outputs x n within at most f (n) steps for all n, and g(n) > O(f (n)). Then
Proof. Since no program that requires at least g(n) steps for producing x n can compute x n in a phase with number < log g(n), we have
Here we have used the Kraft inequality [51] to obtain a rough upper bound for the enumerator: when no p is prefix of another one, then p 2
Hence, if we know a rather fast finite program p x for x, then Theorem 6.1 allows for predicting: if we observe some x n (n sufficiently large) then it is very unlikely that it was produced by an x-computing algorithm much slower than p x .
Among the fastest algorithms for x is FAST itself, which is at least as fast as p x , save for a constant factor. It outputs x n after O(2 Kt(xn) ) steps. Therefore Theorem 6.1 tells us:
For n → ∞, with probability 1 the continuation of x n is computable within O(2 Kt(xn) ) steps.
Given observation x with l(x) → ∞, we predict a continuation y with minimal Kt(xy).
Example 6.1 Consider Example 1.2 and Equation (1). According to the weak anthropic principle, the conditional probability of a particular observer finding herself in one of the universes compatible with her existence equals 1. Given S, we predict a universe with minimal Kt. Short futures are more likely than long ones: the probability that the universe's history so far will extend beyond the one computable in the current phase of FAST (that is, it will be prolongated into the next phase) is at most 50 %. Infinite futures have measure zero.
Practical Applications of Algorithm GUESS
Algorithm GUESS is almost identical to a probabilistic search algorithm used in previous work on applied inductive inference [71, 73] . The programs generated by the previous algorithm, however, were not bitstrings but written in an assembler-like language; their runtimes had an upper bound, and the program outputs were evaluated as to whether they represented solutions to externally given tasks. Using a small set of exemplary training examples, the system discovered the weight matrix of an artificial neural network whose task was to map input data to appropriate target classifications. The network's generalization capability was then tested on a much larger unseen test set. On several toy problems it generalized extremely well in a way unmatchable by traditional neural network learning algorithms.
The previous papers, however, did not explicitly establish the above-mentioned relation between "optimal" resource bias and GUESS.
Consequences for Physics
As obvious from equations (1) and (15), some observer's future depends on the prior from which his/her universe is sampled. More or less general notions of TM-based describability put forward above lead to more or less dominant priors such as P G on formally describable universes, P E and µ E on enumerable universes, P M and µ M and recursive priors on monotonically computable universes, S on S-describable universes. We will now comment on the plausibility of each, and discuss some consequences. Prior S, the arguably most plausible and natural one, provokes specific predictions concerning our future. For a start, however, we will briefly review Solomonoff's traditional theory of inductive inference based on recursive priors.
Plausibility of Recursive Priors
The first number is 2, the second is 4, the third is 6, the fourth is 8. What is the fifth? The correct answer is "250," because the nth number is n 5 − 5n 4 − 15n 3 + 125n 2 − 224n + 120. In certain IQ tests, however, the answer "250" will not yield maximal score, because it does not seem to be the "simplest" answer consistent with the data (compare [73] ). And physicists and others favor "simple" explanations of observations. Roughly fourty years ago Solomonoff set out to provide a theoretical justification of this quest for simplicity [82] . He and others have made substantial progress over the past decades. In particular, technical problems of Solomonoff's original approach were partly overcome by Levin [54] who introduced self-delimiting programs, m and µ M mentioned above, as well as several theorems relating probabilities to complexities -see also Chaitin's and Gács' independent papers on prefix complexity and m [35, 27] . Solomonoff's work on inductive inference helped to inspire less general yet practically more feasible principles of minimum description length [95, 66, 44] as well as time-bounded restrictions of Kolmogorov complexity, e.g., [42, 2, 96, 56] , as well as the concept of "logical depth" of x, the runtime of the shortest program of x [8] .
Equation (15) makes predictions of the entire future, given the past. This seems to be the most general approach. Solomonoff [83] focuses just on the next bit in a sequence. Although this provokes surprisingly nontrivial problems associated with translating the bitwise approach to alphabets other than the binary one -only recently Hutter managed to do this [48] -it is sufficient for obtaining essential insights [83] .
Given an observed bitstring x, Solomonoff assumes the data are drawn according to a recursive measure µ; that is, there is a MTM program that reads x ∈ B * and computes µ(x) and halts. He estimates the probability of the next bit (assuming there will be one), using the fact that the enumerable µ M dominates the less general recursive measures:
where c µ is a constant depending on µ but not on x. Compare [56, p. 282 ff]. Solomonoff showed that the µ M -probability of a particular continuation converges towards µ as the observation size goes to infinity [83] . Hutter recently extended his results by showing that the number of prediction errors made by universal Solomonoff prediction is essentially bounded by the number of errors made by any other recursive prediction scheme, including the optimal scheme based on the true distribution µ [47] . Hutter also extended Solomonoff's passive universal induction framework to the case of agents actively interacting with an unknown environment [49] .
A previous paper on computable universes [72, Section: Are we Run by a Short Algorithm?] applied the theory of inductive inference to entire universe histories, and predicted that simple universes are more likely; that is, observers are likely to find themselves in a simple universe compatible with their existence (compare everything mailing list archive [30] , messages dated 21 Oct and 25 Oct 1999: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1284.html and m1312.html). There are two ways in which one could criticize this approach. One suggests it is too general, the other suggests it is too restrictive.
1. Recursive priors too general? µ M (x) is not recursively computable, hence there is no general practically feasible algorithm to generate optimal predictions. This suggests to look at more restrictive priors, in particular, S, which will receive additional motivation further below.
Recursive priors too restricted?
If we want to explain the entire universe, then the assumption of a recursive P on the possible universes may even be insufficient. In particular, although our own universe seems to obey simple rules -a discretized version of Schrödinger's wave function could be implemented by a simple recursive algorithm -the apparently noisy fluctuations that we observe on top of the simple laws might be due to a pseudorandom generator (PRG) subroutine whose output is describable, even enumerable, but not recursive -compare Example 2.1.
In particular, the fact that nonrecursive priors may not allow for recursive bounds on the time necessary to compute initial histories of some universe does not necessarily prohibit nonrecursive priors. Each describable initial history may be potentially relevant as there is an infinite computation during which it will be stable for all but finitely many steps. This suggests to look at more general priors such as µ E , P E , P G , which will be done next, before we come back to the speed prior S.
Plausibility of Cumulatively Enumerable Priors
The semimeasure µ M used in the traditional theory of inductive inference is dominated by the nonenumerable yet approximable µ E (Def. 4.17) assigning approximable probabilities to initial segments of strings computable on EOMs.
As Chaitin points out [28] , enumerable objects such as the halting probabilities of TMs are already expressive enough to express anything provable by finite proofs, given a set of mathematical axioms. In particular, knowledge of Ω T n , the first n bits of the halting probability of TM T , conveys all information necessary to decide by a halting program whether any given statement of an axiomatic system describable by fewer than n − O(1) bits is provable or not within the system. Ω T n is effectively random in the sense of Martin-Löf [61] . Therefore it is generally undistinguishable from noise by a recursive function of n, and thus very compact in a certain sense -in fact, all effectively random reals are Omegas, as recently shown by Slaman [80] building on work by Solovay [84] ; see also [21, 85] . One could still say, however, that Ω decompresses mathematical truth at least enough to make it retrievable by a halting program. Assuming that this type of mathematical truth contains everything relevant for a theory of all reasonable universes, and assuming that the describable yet even "more random" patterns of Theorem 3.3 are not necessary for such a theory, we may indeed limit ourselves to the enumerable universes.
If Conjecture 5.2 were true, then we would have (15)). That is, the most likely continuation y would essentially be the one corresponding to the shortest algorithm, and no cumulatively enumerable distribution could assign higher probability than O(2 −K E (xy) ) to xy. Maximizing P E (xy) would be equivalent to minimizing K E (xy).
Since the upper bound given by Theorem 5.3 is not quite as sharp due to the additional, at most logarithmic term, we cannot make quite as strong a statement. Still, Theorem 5.3 does tell us that P E (xy) goes to zero with growing K E (xy) almost exponentially fast, and Theorem 5.6 says that µ E (xy k ) (k fix) goes to zero with growing Km E (xy k ) almost exponentially fast. Hence, the relatively mild assumption that the probability distribution from which our universe is drawn is cumulatively enumerable provides a theoretical justification of the prediction that the most likely continuations of our universes are computable by short EOM algorithms. However, given P E , Occam's razor (e.g., [11] ) is only partially justified because the sum of the probabilities of the most complex xy does not vanish:
To see this, compare Def. 4.12 and the subsequent paragraph on program continua. There would be a nonvanishing chance for an observer to end up in one of the maximally complex universes compatible with his existence, although only universes with finite descriptions have nonvanishing individual probability. We will conclude this subsection by addressing the issue of falsifiability. If P E or µ E were responsible for the pseudorandom aspects of our universe (compare Example 2.1), then this might indeed be effectively undetectable in principle, because some approximable and enumerable patterns cannot be proven to be nonrandom in recursively bounded time. Therefore the results above may be of interest mainly from a philosophical point of view, not from a practical one: yes, universes computable by short EOM algorithms are much more likely indeed, but even if we inhabit one then we may not be able to find its short algorithm.
Plausibility of Approximable Priors
µ E assigns low probability to G-describable strings such as the z of Theorem 3.3. However, one might believe in the potential significance of such constructively describable patterns, e.g., by accepting their validity as possible pseudorandom perturbations of a universe otherwise governed by a quickly computable algorithm implementing simple physical lawscompare Example 2.1. Then one must also look at semimeasures dominating µ E , although the falsifiability problem mentioned above holds for those as well.
The top of the TM dominance hierarchy is embodied by G (Theorem 3.3); the top of our prior dominance hierarchy by P G , the top of the corresponding semimeasure dominance hierarchy by µ G . If Conjecture 5.3 were true, then maximizing P G (xy) would be equivalent to minimizing K G (xy). Even then there would be a fundamental problem besides lack of falsifiability: Neither P G nor µ G are describable, and not even a "Great Programmer" [72] could generally decide whether some GTM output is going to converge (Theorem 2.1), or whether it actually represents a "meaningless" universe history that never stabilizes.
Thus, if one adopts the belief that nondescribable measures do not exist, simply because there is no way of describing them, then one may discard this option.
This would suggest considering semimeasures less dominant than µ G , for instance, one of the most dominant approximable µ. According to Theorem 5.5 and inequality (43) , µ(xy) goes to zero almost exponentially fast with growing Km G (xy).
As in the case of µ E , this may interest the philosophically inclined more than the pragmatists: yes, any particular universe history without short description necessarily is highly unlikely; much more likely are those histories where our lives are deterministically computed by a short algorithm, where the algorithmic entropy (compare [98] ) of the universe does not increase over time, because a finite program conveying a finite amount of information is responsible for everything, and where concepts such as "free will" are just an illusion in a certain sense. Nevertheless, there may not be any effective way of proving or falsifying this.
Plausibility of Speed Prior S
Starting with the traditional case of recursive priors, the subsections above discussed more and more dominant priors as candidates for the one from which our universe is sampled. Now we will move towards the other extreme: the less dominant prior S which in a sense is optimal with respect to temporal complexity.
So far, without much ado, we have used a terminology according to which we "draw a universe from a particular prior distribution." In the TM-based set-ups (see Def. 4.12) this in principle requires a "binary oracle," a source of true randomness, to provide the TM's inputs. Any source of randomness, however, leaves us with an unsatisfactory explanation of the universe, since random strings do not have a compact explanation, by definition. The obvious way around this, already implicit in the definition of µ T (x) (see Def. 4.17) , is the "ensemble approach" which runs all possible TM input programs and sums over the lengths of those that compute strings starting with x.
Once we deal with ensemble approaches and explicit computations in general, however, we are forced to accept their fundamental time constraints. As mentioned above, many of the shortest programs of certain enumerable or describable strings compute their outputs more slowly than any recursive upper bound could indicate.
If we do assume that time complexity of the computation should be an issue, then why stop with the somewhat arbitrary restriction of recursiveness, which just says that the time required to compute something should be computable by a halting program? Similarly, why stop with the somewhat arbitrary restriction of polynomial time bounds which are subject of much of the work in theoretical computer science?
If I were a "Great Programmer" [72] with substantial computing resources, perhaps beyond those possible in our own universe which apparently does not permit more than 10 51 operations per second and kilogram [16, 57] , yet constrained by the fundamental limits of computability, I would opt for the fastest way of simulating all universes, represented by algorithm FAST (Section 6). Similarly, if I were to search for some computable object with certain properties discoverable by Levin's universal search algorithm (the "mother" of FAST), I would use the latter for its optimality properties.
Consider the observers evolving in the many different possible universes computed by FAST or as a by-product of Levin Search. Some of them would be identical, at least for some time, collecting identical experiences in universes with possibly equal beginnings yet possibly different futures. At a given time, the most likely instances of a particular observer A would essentially be determined by the fastest way of computing A.
Observer A might adopt the belief the Great Programmer was indeed smart enough to implement the most efficient way of computing everything. And given A's very existence, A can conclude that the Great Programmer's resources are sufficient to compute at least one instance of A. What A does not know, however, is the current phase of FAST, or whether the Great Programmer is interested in or aware of A, or whether A is just an accidental by-product of some Great Programmer's search for something else, etc.
Here is where a resource-oriented bias comes in naturally. It seems to make sense for A to assume that the Great Programmer is also bound by the limits of computability, that infinitely late phases of FAST consuming uncountable resources are infinitely unlikely, that any Great Programmer's a priori probability of investing computational resources into some search problem tends to decrease with growing search costs, and that the prior probability of anything whose computation requires more than O(n) resources by the optimal method is indeed inversely proportional to n. This immediately leads to the speed prior S.
Believing in S, A could use Theorem 6.1 to predict the future (or "postdict" unknown aspects of the past) by assigning highest probability to those S-describable futures (or pasts) that are (a) consistent with A's experiences and (b) are computable by short and fast algorithms. The appropriate simplicity measure minimized by this resource-oriented version of Occam's razor is the Levin complexity Kt.
S-Based Predictions
If our universe is indeed sampled from the speed prior S, then we might well be able to discover the algorithm for the apparent noise on top of the seemingly simple physical laws -compare Example 1.1. It may not be trivial, as trivial pseudorandom generators (PRGs) may not be quite sufficient for evolution of observers such as ourselves, given the other laws of physics. But it should be much less time-consuming than, say, an algorithm computing the z of Theorem 3.3 which are effectively indistinguishable from true, incompressible noise.
Based on prior S, we predict: anything that appears random or noisy in our own particular world is due to hitherto unknown regularities that relate seemingly disconnected events to each other via some simple algorithm that is not only short (the short algorithms are favored by all describable measures above) but also fast. This immediately leads to more specific predictions.
Beta Decay
When exactly will a particular neutron decay into a proton, an electron and an antineutrino? Is the moment of its death correlated with other events in our universe? Conventional wisdom rejects this idea and suggests that beta decay is a source of true randomness. According to S, however, this cannot be the case. Never-ending true randomness is neither formally describable (Def. 2.5) nor S-describable (Def. 6.1); its computation would not be possible using countable computational steps.
This encourages a re-examination of beta decay or other types of particle decay: given S, a very simple and fast but maybe not quite trivial PRG should be responsible for the decay pattern of possibly widely separated neutrons. (If the PRG were too trivial and too obvious then maybe the resulting universe would be too simple to permit evolution of our type of consciousness, thus being ruled out by the weak anthropic principle.) Perhaps the main reason for the current absence of empirical evidence in this vein is that nobody has systematically looked for it yet.
Many World Splits
Everett's many worlds hypothesis [33] essentially states: whenever our universe's quantum mechanics based on Schrödinger's equation allows for alternative "collapses of the wave function," all are made and the world splits into separate universes. The previous paper [72] already pointed out that from our algorithmic point of view there are no real splitsthere are just a bunch of different algorithms which yield identical results for some time, until they start computing different outputs corresponding to different possible observations in different universes. According to P G , P E , µ E , µ M , S, however, most of these alternative continuations are much less likely than others.
In particular, the outcomes of experiments involving entangled states, such as the observations of spins of initially close but soon distant particles with correlated spins, are currently widely assumed to be random. Given S, however, whenever there are several possible continuations of our universe corresponding to different wave function collapses, and all are compatible with whatever it is we call our consciousness, we are more likely to end up in one computable by a short and fast algorithm. A re-examination of split experiment data might reveil unexpected, nonobvious, nonlocal algorithmic regularity due to a PRG.
This prediction runs against current mainstream trends in physics, with the possible exception of hidden variable theory, e.g., [7, 12, 90] .
Expected Duration of the Universe
Given S, the probability that the history of the universe so far will reach into the next phase of FAST is at most 1 2 -compare Example 6.1. Does that mean there is a 50 % chance that our universe will get at least twice as old as it is now? Not necessarily, if the computation of its state at the n-th time step (local time) requires more than O(n) time.
As long as there is no compelling contrarian evidence, however, a reasonable guess would be that our universe is indeed among the fastest ones with O(1) output bits per constant time interval consumed by algorithm FAST. It may even be "locally" computable through simple simulated processors, each interacting with only few neighbouring processors, assuming that the pseudorandom aspects of our universe do not require any more global communication between spatio-temporally separated parts than the well-known physical laws. Note that the fastest universe evolutions include those representable as sequences of substrings of constant length l, where each substring stands for the universe's discretized state at a certain discrete time step and is computable from the previous substring in O(l) time (compare Example 1.1). However, the fastest universes also include those whose representations of successive discrete time steps do grow over time and where more and more time is spent on their computation. The expansion of certain computable universes actually requires this.
In any case, the probability that ours will last 2 n times longer than it has lasted so far is at most 2 −n (except, of course, when its early states are for some reason much harder to compute than later ones and we are still in an early state). This prediction also differs from those of current mainstream physics (compare [40] though), but obviously is not verifiable.
Short Algorithm Detectable?
Simple PRG subroutines of the universe may not necessarily be easy to find. For instance, the second billion bits of π's dyadic expansion "look" highly random although they are not, because they are computable by a very short algorithm. Another problem with existing data may be its potential incompleteness. To exemplify this: it is easy to see the pattern in an observed sequence 1, 2, 3, . . . , 100. But if many values are missing, resulting in an observed subsequence of, say, 7, 19, 54, 57, the pattern will be less obvious.
A systematic enumeration and execution of all candidate algorithms in the time-optimal style of Levin search [53] should find one consistent with the data essentially as quickly as possible. Still, currently we do not have an a priori upper bound on the search time. This points to a problem of falsifiability.
Another caveat is that the algorithm computing our universe may somehow be wired up to defend itself against the discovery of its simple PRG. According to Heisenberg we cannot observe the precise, current state of a single electron, let alone our universe, because our actions seem to influence our measurements in a fundamentally unpredictable way. This does not rule out a predictable underlying computational process whose deterministic results we just cannot access [72] -compare hidden variable theory [7, 12, 90] . More research, however, is necessary to determine to what extent such fundamental undetectability is possible in principle from a computational perspective (compare [87, 68] ).
For now there is no reason why believers in S should let themselves get discouraged too quickly from searching for simple algorithmic regularity in apparently noisy physical events such as beta decay and "many world splits" in the spirit of Everett [33] . The potential rewards of such a revolutionary discovery would merit significant experimental and analytic efforts.
Relation to Previous Work on All Possible Universes
A previous paper on computable universes [72] already pointed out that computing all universes with all possible types of physical laws tends to be much cheaper in terms of information requirements than computing just one particular, arbitrarily chosen one, because there is an extremely short algorithm that systematically enumerates and runs all computable universes, while most individual universes have very long shortest descriptions. The subset embodied by the many worlds of Everett III's "many worlds hypothesis" [33] was considered a by-product of this more general set-up.
The previous paper apparently also was the first to apply the theory of inductive inference to entire universe histories [72 [86, 81] , and see Calude and Meyerstein [22] for a somewhat contrarian view.
The current paper introduces simplicity measures more dominant than the traditional ones [50, 82, 83, 26, 100, 52, 54, 35, 27, 36, 77, 28, 37, 56] , and provides a more general, more technical, and more detailed account, incorporating several novel theoretical results based on generalizations of Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability. In particular, it stretches the notions of computability and constructivism to the limits, by considering not only MTM-based traditional computability but also less restrictive GTM-based and EOM-based describability, and proves several relevant "Occams razor theorems." Unlike the previous paper [72] it also analyzes fundamental time constraints on the computation of everything, and derives predictions based on these restrictions.
Rather than pursuing the computability-oriented path layed out in [72] , Tegmark recently suggested what at first glance seems to be an alternative ensemble of possible universes based on a (somewhat vaguely defined) set of "self-consistent mathematical structures" [89] , thus going beyond his earlier, less general work [88] on physical constants and Everett's many world variants [33] of our own particular universe -compare also Marchal's and Bostrom's theses [60, 15] . It is not quite clear whether Tegmark would like to include universes that are not formally describable according to Def. 2.5. It is well-known, however, that for any set of mathematical axioms there is a program that lists all provable theorems in order of the lengths of their shortest proofs encoded as bitstrings. Since the TM that computes all bitstrings outputs all these proofs for all possible sets of axioms, Tegmark's view [89] seems in a certain sense encompassed by the algorithmic approach [72] . On the other hand, there are many formal axiomatic systems powerful enough to encode all computations of all possible TMs, e.g., number theory. In this sense the algorithmic approach is encompassed by number theory.
The algorithmic approach, however, offers several conceptual advantages: (1) It provides the appropriate framework for issues of information-theoretic complexity traditionally ignored in pure mathematics, and imposes natural complexity-based orderings on the possible universes and subsets thereof. (2) It taps into a rich source of theoretical insights on computable probability distributions relevant for establishing priors on possible universes. Such priors are needed for making probabilistic predictions concerning our own particular universe. Although Tegmark suggests that "... all mathematical structures are a priori given equal statistical weight" [89] (p. 27), there is no way of assigning equal nonvanishing probability to all (infinitely many) mathematical structures. Hence we really need something like the complexity-based weightings discussed in [72] and especially the paper at hand. (3) The algorithmic approach is the obvious framework for questions of temporal complexity such as those discussed in this paper, e.g., "what is the most efficient way of simulating all universes?"
Concluding Remarks
There is an entire spectrum of ways of ordering the describable things, spanned by two extreme ways of doing it. Sections 2-5 analyzed one of the extremes, based on minimal constructive description size on generalized Turing Machines more expressive than those considered in previous work on Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability and inductive inference. Section 6 discussed the other extreme based on the fastest way of computing all computable things.
Between the two extremes we find methods for ordering describable things by (a) their minimal nonhalting enumerable descriptions (also discussed in Sections 2-5), (b) their minimal halting or monotonic descriptions (this is the traditional theory of Kolmogorov complexity or algorithmic information), and (c) the polynomial time complexity-oriented criteria being subject of most work in theoretical computer science. Theorems in Sections 2-6 reveil some of the structure of the computable and enumerable and constructively describable things.
Both extremes of the spectrum as well as some of the intermediate points yield natural prior distributions on describable objects. The approximable and cumulatively enumerable description size-based priors (Sections 4-5) suggest algorithmic theories of everything (TOEs) partially justifying Occam's razor in a way more general than previous approaches: given several explanations of your universe, those requiring few bits of information are much more probable than those requiring many bits (Section 7). However, there may not be an effective procedure for discovering a compact and complete explanation even if there is one.
The resource-optimal, less dominant, yet arguably more plausible extreme (Section 6) leads to an algorithmic TOE without excessive temporal complexity: no calculation of any universe computable in countable time needs to suffer from an essential slow-down due to simultaneous computation of all the others. Based on the rather weak assumption that the world's creator is constrained by certain limits of computability, and considering that all of us may be just accidental by-products of His optimally efficient search for a solution to some computational problem, the resulting "speed prior" predicts that a fast and short algorithm is responsible not only for the apparently simple laws of physics but even for what most physicists currently classify as noise or randomness (Section 7). It may be not all that hard to find; we should search for it.
Much of this paper highlights differences between countable and uncountable sets. It is argued (Sections 6, 7) that things such as uncountable time and space and incomputable probabilities actually should not play a role in explaining the world, for lack of evidence that they are really necessary. Some may feel tempted to counter this line of reasoning by pointing out that for centuries physicists have calculated with continua of real numbers, most of them incomputable. Even quantum physicists who are ready to give up the assumption of a continuous universe usually do take for granted the existence of continuous probability distributions on their discrete universes, and Stephen Hawking explicitly said: "Although there have been suggestions that space-time may have a discrete structure I see no reason to abandon the continuum theories that have been so successful." Note, however, that all physicists in fact have only manipulated discrete symbols, thus generating finite, describable proofs of their results derived from enumerable axioms. That real numbers really exist in a way transcending the finite symbol strings used by everybody may be a figment of imagination -compare Brouwer's constructive mathematics [17, 6] and the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem [58, 79] which implies that any first order theory with an uncountable model such as the real numbers also has a countable model. As Kronecker put it: "Die ganze Zahl schuf der liebe Gott, allesÜbrige ist Menschenwerk" ("God created the integers, all else is the work of man" [20] ). Kronecker greeted with scepticism Cantor's celebrated insight [23] about real numbers, mathematical objects Kronecker believed did not even exist.
A good reason to study algorithmic, noncontinuous, discrete TOEs is that they are the simplest ones compatible with everything we know, in the sense that universes that cannot even be described formally are obviously less simple than others. In particular, the speed prior-based algorithmic TOE (Sections 6, 7) neither requires an uncountable ensemble of universes (not even describable in the sense of Def. 6.1), nor infinitely many bits to specify nondescribable real-valued probabilities or nondescribable infinite random sequences. One may believe in the validity of algorithmic TOEs until (a) there is evidence against them, e.g., someone shows that our own universe is not formally describable and would not be possible without, say, existence of incomputable numbers, or (b) someone comes up with an even simpler explanation of everything. But what could that possibly be?
Philosophers tend to create theories inspired by recent scientific developments. For instance, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Gödel's incompleteness theorem greatly influenced modern philosophy. Are algorithmic TOEs and the "Great Programmer Religion" [72] just another reaction to recent developments, some in hindsight obvious by-product of the advent of good virtual reality? Will they soon become obsolete, as so many previous philosophies? We find it hard to imagine so, even without a boost to be expected for algorithmic TOEs in case someone should indeed discover a simple subroutine responsible for certain physical events hitherto believed to be irregular. After all, algorithmic theories of the describable do encompass everything we will ever be able to talk and write about. Other things are simply beyond description.
